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At the end of an interview, while waiting for M, I asked a farm worker a question 
that was not listed on my schedule:  “As someone who grew up in this valley, have 
things in your experience got better or worse?”  
The worker concerned, whom I shall call Faan, was 40 years old. The best part of his 
childhood years must have been in the 1970s. His working life would have started in 
the 1980s. A colleague who accompanied him had also grown up in the Hex River 
valley. Both were employed on a farm belonging to a company that owned several 
other farms in the valley.  It was a private company owned, so far as they were 
aware, by an individual farmer.  Let me call him Mr. Q. 
One would not have expected Faan to say that things had simply stayed the same.  
The changes that had taken place in the valley were all too visible.  In and around 
the small town that is the commercial hub of the valley an informal settlement has 
mushroomed on both sides of the N1.  On the town-side of the road it is known as 
Dixiekamp. On the far side it is appropriately known as Stofland. There is another 
informal settlement further down the road, in the direction of Worcester.  This is 
“GG camp” (its name evidently inspired by the licence plates of government garage 
vehicles that visit there).   
Faan is a general worker with Grade 12 schooling.  That is another indication of a 
change that had taken place in the valley.  Although information specific to the valley 
is lacking, it is most unlikely one would have found a general worker who had 
completed his or her secondary schooling in the 1970s and 1980s, when Faan was 
going to school. What is more, Faan is articulate.  In the 1970s, farm workers were 
not. “It is… difficult to access personal feeling and aspirations of farm workers 
because they are generally inarticulate”, a commentator wrote in a paper delivered 
at a conference on farm labour in 1976.2   
On the other hand this perceived difficulty may have had more to do with the social 
status of the writer, a prominent farmer in the valley, than with a real inability on 
the part of workers to articulate their aspirations. A worker would have been taking 
                                                                    
1 The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of Phamhidzai Bamu in undertaking this 
research.  
2 Graaff “Farming in the Hexriver Valley” SALDRU Farm Labour Conference (September 1976) 
Paper No. 42, 1 at 7. 




a distinct risk in articulating his or her real aspirations to an employer in the 1970s 
and 1980s. An appropriate degree of servility was requisite, epitomised by utilising 
the term “baas” in all references to the farmer, including to third parties such as the 
researchers. Here, too, was evidence of a change that had taken place. Faan referred 
to the owner as “Mister”.      
At any event, my question to Faan prompted a swift response.  This was framed as a 
rhetorical question, as responses often are in working-class discourse.  “How can 
one say things have changed for the better when one’s employer (referring to Mr. Q) 
feeds his dogs a meal intended for his gardener, and gives him dry bread instead?”  
Clearly Faan was referring to a specific event.  When asked what had happened, and 
whether he had personal knowledge of it, he explained that he had not witnessed 
what occurred but that his colleague had. The story went as follows.  About three 
years ago Mr Q’s son took the gardener a plate of food: chops left-over from a braai 
the night before, and bread.  Before the gardener had started to eat, Mr Q arrived on 
the scene.  He snatched the plate away from the gardener, stating that this was not 
suitable food for him.  He threw the chops to his dogs and brought the gardener dry 
bread instead. 
One imagines that Mr Q, if confronted, would present a different account of what 
had happened. He would deny snatching the plate away. Probably he would advance 
a persuasive reason for taking it: the food was not good enough for the gardener to 
eat, perhaps; it was only good for the dogs.  But the issue here is not whose 
explanation is the more persuasive in the court of public opinion. It is rather how 
Faan and his colleague interpreted their boss’s action.  Both Faan and his colleague 
are active members of a union that is regarded as sufficiently representative of 
workers on the farm. It is therefore likely that their interpretation is one Mr. Q’s 
workers believe, or at least a significant number of them.3 
Faan’s story illustrates the extent to which the paternalist ideology in terms of 
which employment relations on farms used to be cloaked has been stripped away.4 
Probably that was Mr. Q’s point: ‘There are no more free lunches on my farm,” one 
imagines him saying to himself. Perhaps it was a message directed at his son as 
much as the gardener. But it also suggests there is something atavistic about labour 
relations in the sector, despite extensive changes in the labour relations regime.     
 
                                                                    
3 The Union is regarded as sufficiently representative for the purposes of stop order deductions 
in terms of section 13 of the LRA of 1995. 
4 Du Toit & Ally "The Externalisation and casualisation of farm labour in Western Cape 
Horticulture: A survey of patterns in the agriculture labour market in key Western Cape districts, 
and their implications for employment justice" Research Report No. 16 Programme for Land and 
Agrarian Studies (2003) 14; Kritzinger, Barrientos & Roussouw “Global Production and flexible 
employment in South African horticulture: experiences of contract workers in fruit exporters.” 
(2004) Sociologia Ruralis  44(1) 17 at 20. According to Du Toit (ibid), “[m]anagement on farms 
has been characterised by paternalist ideology…. Paternalist ideology served to maintain social 





2  THE AIMS OF THIS PAPER  
Stofland was established in 2006, supposedly as a “transitional” camp for those 
living in crowded conditions in the formal township, in backyard dwellings and the 
like.5 But the transition to a formal township has not occurred. Instead it and the 
other informal settlement seem to be expanding, and foreign migrants are a visible 
presence. There are no non-agricultural job prospects of any significance in the 
valley. The only conceivable economic rationale for such a concentration of 
humanity is the prospect of employment on farms in the valley.  
Employment creation is a national priority, and it is often said that agriculture (and 
agro-processing) is (or should be) a sector in which jobs are created. This has not 
happened. According to official statistics jobs have been shed.6 A study on 
employment in the valley confirms this trend. Despite the fact that the area under 
cultivation expanded by half, the number of jobs had fallen by 30 percent over a 
thirty-year period.7 How, then, are the job statistics reconciled with burgeoning 
informal settlements? The most plausible explanation seemed to be a growth of 
indirect employment.  
The primary aim of this study was to investigate whether there had indeed been a 
growth of indirect employment, and to what extent this was attributable to the 
labour regime, as well as its consequences for that regime. The term “regime” is 
used here to denote both labour legislation and the institutions that underpin it, 
including the trade unions. Indirect employment occurs where employment has 
been externalised, and workers are “employed” by intermediaries who in turn 
provide them to a user or client, in this case the farmer. Although employed in 
agriculture, the business of the employer is in services. To the extent that it is 
captured at all in official statistics, it is probably reflected as employment in 
services.8  
To seek to attribute the form employment takes to a particular labour regime is one 
thing. It is quite another to attribute economic consequences to the labour regime, 
such as the failure of the economy to generate employment or the loss of jobs in 
agriculture. Yet there is powerful institutional support for such an argument. 
Although the global economic crisis that has arisen at the time of writing calls into 
question some of its premises, it is nevertheless an argument that must be taken 
seriously, not least because of the doggedness with which it is pursued. 9 
                                                                    
5 Interview, 13 November 2008. 
6 According to Statistics SA, employment in agriculture has been in fairly steady decline since 
September 2001. Employment in agriculture accounted for 7,8 percent of total employment, or 
one million jobs, in September 2007: Labour Force Survey September 2007 vi Table E. 
7 Conradie “What do we mean when we say casualisation of farm work is rising? Evidence from 
fruit farms in the Western Cape” Agrekon 46(2) (2007) 173. 
8 Theron “The shift to services and triangular employment: implications for labour market 
reform” (2008) 29 Industrial Law Journal 1.  
9 An acknowledged cause of the global financial crisis was US home-owners defaulting on their 
mortgages.  The need for better regulation of financial markets is now generally acknowledged, 
and the notion that markets are capable of regulating themselves (propagated by Hayek) is now 
discredited.  It is less often acknowledged that one of the reasons US home-owners defaulted can 
surely be attributed to unregulated labour markets, in that ever fewer borrowers have the 
security of a standard job. 





A second aim of this paper is to interrogate the argument which in broad terms goes 
as follows: labour legislation has served to introduce “rigidities” in the labour 
market and trade unions (through collective bargaining) have pushed up minimum 
wages to unrealistic levels.  The cumulative effect has been that capital is not willing 
or able to employ. Taken a step further, it is argued that labour regime is itself an 
obstacle to the alleviation of poverty. 
The World Bank, through its “Doing Business” survey, is driving a process whereby 
labour and other regulations supposedly impacting on business are “costed”, 
purportedly objectively. Countries are then ranked according to the scores achieved. 
Ostensibly this survey is not concerned with “deregulation” as much as reform. 
However, a country that has no labour regulation at all will obtain a most favourable 
rating as compared with a country with labour regulation, regardless of its content.  
In a local variant of essentially the same argument, organised labour is portrayed as 
representing vested interests with no interest in opting for what is the optimal 
solution for the poor in an economy with high unemployment, namely low-wage 
employment.10 This situation is perpetuated because “the poor” do not have the 
political clout to challenge these vested interests and occupy institutional forums, 
such as NEDLAC, where policy is formulated.   
Disregard for the time being an obvious question that this analysis begs, namely 
how “the poor” are expected to achieve political clout without organisation and 
what form such organisation should take. By invoking “the poor”, the protagonists of 
this argument seek to secure the moral high ground. Their antagonists can be 
regarded as those who, out of a misguided concern for workers’ rights, are 
protagonists of the labour regime. Mindful that “the poor” is not a coherent category, 
they pinpoint (in my opinion, correctly) a weak point in the argument of their 
antagonists and, more broadly, in the tradition of Marxist scholarship. This is its 
failure to analyse or address the growth of inequality in what had hitherto been 
termed the working class in the period since transition to democracy.  
Accordingly, with the object of understanding inequality in society, Seekings and 
Nattrass resort to a class analysis of their own. In this analysis the occupation of 
members of households is a critical determinant of their class position.11 At the 
same time they argue that what they term the “labour contract” (by which, it 
appears, they mean a written contract of employment) is a key distinction between 
what they (tentatively) categorise as the “core working class” as opposed to a 
“marginal working class”.12 Farm workers are posited as part of that marginal 
                                                                    
10 Seekings J & Nattrass N  Class, Race and Inequality in South Africa Yale University Press, New 
Haven (2005) at 380-381. 
11 Ibid 241. 
12 “In the South African context, as in Brazil and many other southern societies, a large number of 
workers sell their wages without any formal contract: their conditions of work are quite 
distinctive and they are especially vulnerable to employers. These clearly include many farm and 
domestic workers….”: Seekings & Natrass op cit 248. The idea that the contract is a critical 
determinant of class position apparently derives from Goldthorpe, who differentiates between 
“service relationships” and “labour contracts” to distinguish the class locations of certain groups: 





working class, and occupy the same structural position in society as what is referred 
to as an “underclass”.13 A subsidiary aim of this paper is to examine the validity of 
this “class analysis”.  
The different aims of this paper are related. It would be naïve to suppose that the 
argument that the labour regime constrains employment creation is not politically 
motivated. But if it were perceived to be politically motivated, it would not fly. 
Hence it is necessary to make an economic case that demonstrates a causal 
relationship between the extension of labour regulation and job losses. The 
appropriate policy intervention then becomes obvious. Labour regulation must be 
reformed (or scrapped). The existence of a “marginal working class” that gains no 
benefit from labour legislation lends political weight to the clamour for its reform. 
At the same time the argument that labour regulation constrains job creation is a 
counter to “inappropriate” reforms that would extend the benefits of regulation to 
the marginal working class. The paper seeks to interrogate and challenge this line of 
reasoning.  
 
3  POINTS OF DEPARTURE 
There are a number of difficulties with any endeavour to establish a causal 
relationship between law and economic consequences, or vice versa. Indeed in 
terms of the theory of autopoiesis such an endeavour is fundamentally 
misconceived. This theory holds that law is essentially a self-referential system of 
communication that is not able to intervene directly in social or economic 
processes.14 This is not to say that law has no effects on these processes, or these 
processes on law, or that one should not attempt to determine them. But it should 
be understood that these effects are indirect, and contingent. 
Attempts to cost the impact of regulation economically, as in the World Bank’s 
“Doing Business” survey, are typically founded on artificial and simplistic 
conceptions of law. This is exemplified by the erroneous belief that it is possible to 
read legal rules from the text of legislation without regard for the regime of which it 
is part.15 It is the legal regime that determines how legislation is interpreted in 
accordance with other rules and applied in practice. 
 To determine the impact of a particular regime, then, detailed case studies are 
needed in which it is possible to take account of law’s complexity. The agricultural 
sector in a number of respects represents an ideal opportunity for undertaking such 
a study. Since the advent of democracy, in the space of ten years, the legal regime 
regulating labour relations in agriculture has been more profoundly transformed 
than in any other sector. At the same time the agriculture sector provides a lens 
through which to scrutinise the notion of a “marginal working class” of which its 
workforce is supposedly part.  
                                                                    
13 Seekings & Natrass op cit 336-339. 
14 It is not possible to give an exposition of this theory here. See, however, Teubner G Law as an 
autopoietic system Blackwell (1993). 
15 Benjamin & Theron “Costing, comparing and competing: Developing an approach to the 
benchmarking of labour market regulation” University of Cape Town, DPRU Working Paper 
07/131 (2007). 




The transformation of the legal regime in agriculture began in 1993 with the partial 
incorporation of farm workers into the previous labour regime.16 Full incorporation 
occurred in 1997 with the adoption of a new Basic Conditions of Employment Act 
(BCEA); henceforth farmers were expected to comply with a relatively worker-
friendly set of conditions of work as well as the labour standards introduced by the 
Labour Relations Act (LRA).17 In the same year the Extension of the Security of 
Tenure Act (ESTA)18 was introduced with the object of protecting the security of 
tenure of occupiers of land, including (notably) farm workers in occupation of 
houses on farms. Then, in 2003, a sectoral determination introduced a minimum 
wage.19  
When minimum wages in the sector were first promulgated in 2002, the farmers’ 
association AgriSA estimated that it would lead to significant job losses.20 
There has been a marked decline in employment in sub-sectors such as wheat and 
dairy. But trade liberalisation in agriculture occurred over roughly the same period 
as labour legislation was extended to agriculture.21 Both are sub-sectors acutely 
affected by the increased competition that resulted from lowering tariffs. If one was 
looking for a smoking gun, trade liberalisation is the most likely suspect.22    
At the same time, the extent to which the regime was transformed should not be 
exaggerated. The minimum wages prescribed were decidedly moderate and would 
probably not have represented an increase at all in certain areas.23 The minimum 
                                                                    
16 The Basic Conditions of Employment Act 3 of 1982 and the Unemployment Insurance Act 30 of 
1966 were both extended to farmworkers in that year. At the same time the Agricultural Labour 
Relations Act 147 of 1993 was introduced. A distinction was drawn between farm workers and 
other employees in respect of labour relations. See in general Le Roux “Agricultural Workers: a 
historical and contemporary perspective” University of Cape Town, Institute of Development and 
Labour Law Monograph Series 1/2002 ((2002).  
17 Act 66 of 1995. 
18 Act 62 of 1997. 
19 Sectoral Determination 8, Farm Worker Sector (superseded by Sectoral Determination 13 in 
2006 – Editor). The sectoral determination and ESTA are probably the two legislative provisions 
that have had the greatest impact on the sector. 
20 Business Day 27 February 2002, cited in Kritzinger, Barrientos & Rossouw “Global Production 
and flexible employment in South African horticulture: experiences of contract workers in fruit 
exporters” Sociologia Ruralis 44(1) (2004) 17 at 21. Although minimum wages for the sector 
were promulgated in 2002, it was only in March 2003 that the new minimum wages eventually 
came into effect. 
21 Trade liberalisation refers to the reduction of tariffs and related measures pursuant to South 
Africa’s obligations in terms of international trade agreements to which it was part. In fact, South 
Africa went far beyond what was required in terms of the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture (URAA), resulting in one of the “least state-protected agricultural sectors in the 
world”: Tilley S “An examination of market-assisted reform in South-Africa” International Labour 
Resource and Information Group (ILRIG), Cape Town (2002) at 4.  
22 Theron, Godfrey & Visser “Globalization, the impact of trade liberalization, and labour law: the 
case of South Africa.”’ ILO, International Institute for Labour Studies, Discussion Paper DP 
178/2007 (2007). An increase of tariffs on both these commodities was subsequently 
contemplated: see “Import tariffs on food in line for comeback” Cape Times Business Report 20 
October 2008. 
23 Thus in area A, comprising the areas of prime agricultural importance, the minimum wage 
prescribed was R800 per month while in area B it was R650 per month. The latter certainly 
represented less in real terms than, according to a 2001 report of the Employment Conditions 





wage in 2008-2009 stood at R1 090 per month.24 More profoundly, the regime 
instituted by the above-mentioned legislation has not displaced the common law to 
the extent that is sometimes supposed. Prior to 1993 this was a common law regime 
in which the doctrine of “sanctity of contract” had pride of place. Simply stated, this 
doctrine means that the parties to a contract are bound by its terms 
notwithstanding any inequality of power between them.25 In the sphere of labour 
relations of farms this meant that the employment relationship was determined by 
the terms of the contract concluded between farmer and worker. It is immaterial 
whether or not the contract is in writing.26 In the context of externalisation, the 
issue is rather with whom there is a contract and under what circumstances (if any) 
the person who actually provides the work, and who is in an economic sense the real 
employer, may be held accountable.   
 
4  NOTES ON METHODOLOGY 
The impact of labour legislation should be more limited and easier to isolate in a 
sub-sector oriented toward exports, such as deciduous fruit.27 This was the primary 
reason that the Hex River valley was selected as the site of this research project. 28 
Initially it was envisaged conducting the field-work for this project by taking a 
sample of farms in the area and interviewing the farmer as well as his workers.  
Other researchers have also used the farmer as their point of contact, and research 
                                                                    
24 For 2009-2010 it was increased to R1 232 and for 2010-2011 to R1 317 – Editor. See Sectoral 
Determination 13: Farm Worker Sector at http://www.labour.gov.za/legislation/sectoral-
determinations/sectoral-determination-13-farm-worker-sectorhttp://www.labour.gov.za/ 
legislation/sectoral-determinations/sectoral-determination-13-farm-worker-sector (accessed 
22 February 2011). 
25 What I refer to as a doctrine comprises a cluster of principles including that reflected by the 
Latin maxim pacta sunt servanda which requires “exact enforcement of contractual obligations 
created in circumstances which are consistent with freedom of contract and consensuality”, and 
the notion of “privity of contract”: see Van der Merwe, Van Huyssteen, Reinecke & Lubbe, 
Contract- General Principles 3ed Juta (2007) at 11. Cockrell’s concept of the “hegemony of 
contract” is also relevant in this context. He argues that contract law occupies a privileged 
position in relation to other branches of law, although the relationship to labour law is not 
expressly considered. See Cockrell “The Hegemony of Contract” (1998) 114 South African Law 
Journal 286.   
26 Section 29 of the BCEA requires that an employer provide written particulars regarding the 
employment of a worker. Where the employer fails to do so there would be a breach of a 
legislative provision. To this extent failure to comply with this provision may be an indicator of 
informality. Beyond this there is no conceptual or empirical basis for attaching any particular 
significance to whether a contract is in writing.   
27 This is not to discount that the export market for deciduous fruit has also changed as a result of 
the ascendance of retail chains in the global North and other factors. It has been argued that there 
has been a shift from a supplier-driven to a buyer-driven market: Kritzinger “Global markets, 
employment restructuring and female labourers on Western Cape fruit farms” Acta Academia 
(2005) 37(1) 99 at 105; Greenberg “Women workers in wine and deciduous fruit global value 
chains” Report for Women on Farms Project (2003) at 4. Even so, it has remained labour 
intensive: Kritzinger op cit at 101.  
28 Grapes are the third largest agricultural export earner after wine and citrus fruit: Edwards et al  
“The position of women workers in wine and deciduous fruit value chains” SANPERI 
Development Consultants; report commissioned by Women on Farms Project (2008) at 18. In 
2004 the Hex River valley contributed 37 percent of the table grape crop: Deciduous Fruit 
Producers Trust, 2004, cited in Conradie (fn 7 above). 




projects that rely exclusively on data provided by the farmer are not usually 
discounted for this reason. There are obviously practical considerations that make 
such an approach necessary. There are also data and perspectives that only the 
farmer would be in a position to supply.  
Yet if one is concerned with labour relations, and how employment is 
structured, reliance on the farmer is problematic. However well-intentioned the 
farmer may be, interviews arranged through the farmer would make it more 
difficult to obtain the workers’ perspective.  At the same time there would be real 
practical difficulties in reaching the most vulnerable sections of the workforce that 
we were most concerned should not be excluded.  
Ultimately the methodology adopted was dictated by considerations of 
realpolitik. If farm workers were to be interviewed at all, it would have to be before 
the peak season. Precious weeks were wasted in negotiating with the employers’ 
association representing farmers in the valley.  The association was concerned that, 
if it was to play any role in facilitating this research, there should be no mention of 
the area that we were researching.29 The association was also not prepared to 
supply a list of its members. It was decided to abandon interviews with the farmers 
once it became clear that there was no realistic prospect of being able to set up a 
sufficient number of interviews before peak season and once it transpired there was 
a way in which we would be able to access farm workers without going through the 
farmers.    
M is the secretary of a small regional union based in Worcester whom I knew. It 
turned out that the union had organised 25 farms in the valley and was planning to 
launch a branch in the near future.30 Researchers attended this meeting and 
arranged to interview workers. M put me in contact with W, who styled himself a 
contractor and was resident in the valley. W was keen to be interviewed, and 
interviews were arranged with him and other contractors. As well as M herself, a 
community leader and an official of the Department of Labour resident in De Doorns 
were interviewed. An official of another union operating in the valley was also 
interviewed telephonically. 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with farm workers arranged 
through M’s union and with the contractors. The interviews with M, the community 
worker and the Department of Labour official were unstructured. In the same week 
as these interviews were being conducted, and just as the peak season was about to 
commence, the heavens exploded and there was serious flooding in the valley. 
Stofland exploded a day or so later, with residents blockading the national road (the 
N1) over issues to do with the provision of services.31  
As already indicated, foreign migrants are a visible presence in Stofland. First 
there were migrants from Lesotho staying in a section of the settlement known as 
                                                                    
29 This is indicative of the fear of being stigmatised that prevails amongst farmers, arguably a 
positive consequence of the power of the retail chains of the global North and the fair-trade 
movement. 
30 We were informed by the community leader that there were approximately 240 farms in the 
valley, but were not able to confirm this.   





Maseru. Now there are migrants from other African countries as well, notably 
Zimbabwe. Because I had the assistance of Zimbabwean researchers, and on the 
assumption that Zimbabwean workers would probably represent the most 
vulnerable section of the seasonal workforce, contact was made with a Zimbabwean 
resident in De Doorns who was also the pastor of a church ministering to 
Zimbabwean migrants.  Interviews were conducted with members of this church 
who were employed on farms by various contractors. 
In the main, therefore, the research is based on three categories of “workers”. 
The first were resident on the farms and unionised. The second were Zimbabwean 
migrants. The third were the contractors. I will explain the categorisation of the 
contractors as workers below.  
 
5  THE HEX RIVER VALLEY THEN AND NOW 
There can be few localities that lend themselves as well to a project on farm labour 
as the Hex River valley.  Geographically bounded by mountains on either side of the 
Hex River, access from the north or south is through a mountain pass.  It is a self-
contained area devoted to the production of a single product – table grapes. Given 
also that it is a comfortable drive from Cape Town, it is not surprising that it has 
generated its own literature. 
As well as the paper already referred to,32 commentators on farm labour that 
have focused on the valley include a 1976 study from the perspective of a labour 
economist,33 comparing the situation in the Hex River Valley with that of the Elgin 
apple farming region.  More recently, there has been a study on externalisation and 
casualisation of farm labour in key farming districts in the Western Cape34 and what 
might be interpreted as a response, again from the perspective of a labour 
economist.35 
Table grapes is a relatively labour-intensive crop.  Labour, then and now, is 
primarily drawn from within the valley: either from workers living on the farms or 
from the town of De Doorns itself.  It would therefore seem ideal terrain for a trade 
union wishing to recruit farm workers as members.  Of course there were no trade 
unions organising farm workers in 1976, and it seems the history of trade union 
organisation in the valley only began post-1994.  At the time of writing there are 
two, perhaps three trade unions with members in the valley.  Although none can be 
said to have a commanding presence, the union M works for is clearly the largest.  
It does not seem the labour process has changed much in the last thirty years. In 
about mid-November farmers begin to prepare for the season. The peak season 
usually begins in early December and is known as “groendruiwetyd”, or thinning 
season. This is the most labour-intensive part of the process.  Workers remove the 
small and undeveloped berries from the bunch, over a period of about six weeks. 
                                                                    
32  Graaff (fn 2 above). 
33 Levy “Seasonal migration in the Western Cape” SALDRU Farm Labour Conference (September 
1976) 87. 
34 Du Toit & Ally (fn 4 above). 
35 Conradie (fn 7 above). 




Thereafter the grapes are picked, and packed.36  This takes place over a period of 
three months, ending in about May. They are pruned in July or August. 
However, contrary to what some have argued,37 the manner in which labour is 
utilised appears to have changed significantly since Levy’s study.  To appreciate the 
nature and extent of the change, it is useful to consider how the significance of the 
categories of “permanent” and “seasonal worker” has changed. “Permanent worker” 
refers to someone who is employed full-time on a contract of indefinite duration.38 
Then and now, permanent workers resided on the farm in houses provided by the 
farmer. However whereas formerly the conditions of the workers’ tenancy were 
unregulated, ESTA now applies.39 
“Seasonal worker” refers to someone employed on a seasonal basis. It does not 
seem that farmers in the valley relied on seasonal workers resident on the farm to 
the same extent as in other fruit-growing areas.40 Where seasonal workers were 
resident on the farm, however, they were assumed to be women and the spouses of 
male farm workers. They are also described as such in the literature.41 
Whether resident on or off the farm, the identity of the employer of seasonal 
workers was not in doubt.  This was the farmer. Seasonal workers, in turn, could be 
distinguished from casual workers.  Although the term “casual worker” had no 
precise legal application in the farming context, it did have elsewhere.  It was 
someone employed for not more than three days in any week.42   
During the six-week thinning season there had always been an influx of workers 
from off the farm. These were workers employed directly by the farmer, sometimes 
with the assistance of a local intermediary, sometimes in terms of a long-standing 
arrangement, from the nearby towns of Touws River and Worcester as well as De 
Doorns itself.43 Even so, there was previously a rough equivalence between the 
number of workers resident on the farm and those who were not.44  At all other 
times of year the seasonal workers resident on the farm far outnumbered workers 
from elsewhere.  
Nowadays it appears that the overwhelming majority of seasonal workers are 
not resident on the farms.  This is true not only during the thinning season, but also 
                                                                    
36 Levy (fn 33 above). 
37 Conradie (fn 7 above). 
38 These can be regarded as the minimum defining characteristics of a standard employment 
relationship. 
39Although not strictly-speaking labour legislation, ESTA is implicated in a trend towards hiring 
off-farm labour (to avoid the obligations ESTA imposes on the land-owner). However, Greenberg 
(2003: 15) argues that the trend began before the passing of ESTA.  
40 In the interview with the Department of Labour official, it was suggested that it had never been 
the practice to source seasonal workers on the farm, as distinct from an area such as Grabouw 
where this was the practice.    
41 Levy (fn 33 above). 
42 Basic Conditions of Employment Act 3 of 1983. 
43 Levy (fn 33 above). 
44 See Levy (fn 33 above) Table 4 at 94. Levy’s study provided data from 18 farms employing a 
total of 649 permanent workers (including 94 African workers on one-year contracts). There 
were 683 seasonal workers resident on the farms and 136 children employed in the thinning 
season.  The number of workers employed from elsewhere in the thinning season was 1 655.  At 





at other times of the year. This is in keeping with a general trend in deciduous fruit 
to recruit workers who live off-farm.45 Off-farm workers are engaged and 
transported to work by intermediaries. These are referred to in the literature and 
the area as contractors.46 However, although a contractor is supposedly different 
from a labour broker in that the former plays a more active role in supervising the 
activities of workers provided to a client,47 from a legal perspective it is 
questionable whether there is substance in the distinction.   
A labour broker is what in post-1994 labour legislation is referred to as a 
temporary employment service (TES).48 In recognising labour brokers as the 
employer of the workers they procure or provide to an employer, it has been argued 
that labour legislation itself has created the legal space employers needed to 
restructure the employment relationship by means of a process of externalisation.49 
There are no special concessions to accommodate the consequences of labour 
broking in agriculture in the Sectoral Determination.50 Consequently the insecurity 
that characterises the relationship between the farmer and labour broker means 
that workers employed by a broker are in an even more insecure position.51   
 
6  WHAT THE PERMANENT WORKERS HAD TO SAY 
Fifteen workers resident on farms were interviewed. Only one, a 21-year-old 
woman living with her parents, was a seasonal worker. She was interviewed at her 
home on the farm, on which about half the interviews were conducted.52 There were 
a number of other workers present where interviews were conducted that for 
reasons of time it was not possible to interview. None of them were seasonal 
workers. A young man who had recently matriculated said he was a seasonal 
worker. But it turned out he was in fact continuously employed. He had simply been 
told he was not permanent.  
The fact that so few seasonal workers were identified from amongst farm 
residents provides some confirmation that the phenomenon of a seasonal worker 
resident on the farm is relatively unusual. It must however be acknowledged that 
the interviewees were from only seven farms.53 Perhaps more telling was the fact 
that, at the time of the interviews, preparations for the season were underway and 
teams of workers from off the farm were already at work, although not in the 
                                                                    
45 Greenberg (fn 27 above) at 15. 
46 Conradie (fn  7 above); Jacobs “Farm Workers, Job Security and Labour Contractors” Elsenburg 
Journal 5(22) (2008). 
47 Jacobs (fn 46 above). 
48 Section 198, LRA of 1995; s 82, BCEA of 1997.  
49 Theron, Godfrey & Lewis “The rise of labour broking and its policy implications” Institute of 
Development and Labour Law, University of Cape Town, Development and Labour Law 
Monograph Series, 1/2005 (2005). 
50 Clause 33, Sectoral Determination 13.  
51 Kritzinger (fn 27 above) at 113-114. 
52 In some instances this was farm land, without the permission of the farmer, and in some 
instances it was on public roads adjacent to farm houses.  
53  Four were African and the remainder were coloured. Their ages ranged from 21 to 59 years. 
Two were matriculants and two, both African men, had no schooling whatsoever. 




numbers there would be during peak season. The consensus was that the off-farm 
workers far outnumbered those resident on the farm.  
Strange to say, the workers resident on farms did not know much else about the 
off-farm workers because they had nothing to do with them. It appears that the 
farmers went to some trouble to ensure that off-farm workers had as little contact 
with residents as possible.  
Nine of the workers interviewed were men and six were women. Where 
husband and wife were employed, it seemed common that both were permanent. 
More significantly, at a number of farms the number of women who were regarded 
as permanent exceeded the number of men. Indeed, it may be because women tend 
to outlive their spouses that they outnumbered the men. 
All were members of M’s union, so the sample is skewed.  On the other hand, it is 
not apparent from the outcome of the interviews in what respect membership of a 
union could have skewed the results.  For membership of the union (thus far, at 
least) seems to have had little impact on the conditions of work. Perhaps the most 
striking finding to emerge from the research was the uniformity of conditions of 
employment across different farms, unionised and non-unionised.  
All the workers earned the minimum wage or slightly more. This translated to 
R1 100 per month.  Workers doing more skilled jobs earned somewhat more: one 
tractor driver earned R1 118 a month, another R1 364.  The highest-earning worker 
interviewed was a lorry driver earning R1 760. This represents a differential of 
about 60 percent between unskilled and skilled.  
There was not an issue in the valley of farmers failing to pay the minimum wage 
to the workers they employed.  A Department of Labour official confirmed that there 
had been no complaints of underpayment in the valley that he was aware of.  The 
only such complaints received concerned the workers employed by contractors.54 It 
is probably not surprising that there is compliance with the sectoral determination 
regarding minimum wages.  It is an affluent area. Farmers in the valley ought to be 
better able to afford the minimum wage than most. It is also not likely there would 
be such flagrant non-compliance within half an hour’s drive from a regional office of 
the Department of Labour. 
Rather, the allegations of non-compliance concerned subtler issues, such as 
whether a farmer was justified in deducting rent for housing which had been 
completed years before and which was not maintained.  Or whether a farmer was 
entitled to deduct monies from workers’ wages for repairs when he charged rent. Or 
whether deductions for electricity were not being inflated. Amongst the seven farms 
there was only one that did not charge rental at all.  In that instance the farmer was 
planning to renovate the cottages, after which rental would be charged. 
One had little sense from the workers interviewed that the wage itself was a 
burning issue.  On the one hand this seemed strange.  Workers, particularly those 
approaching retirement age, cannot have failed to be aware of the amount of a social 
grant.  A family in which only one member was employed would be no better off 
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than a family in which all were unemployed but there was a recipient of a social 
grant.55  On the other hand there appeared to be a perception that the wage was 
akin to the social grant, as something that the government determined and which 
workers were obliged to accept. There was no farm in the sample at which the union 
bargained collectively and, so far as it was possible to establish, no farm in the valley 
at which bargaining took place at all.56 
The only issue about wages that was raised concerned the differential between 
the daily rate workers resident on the farm earned and the rate contractors paid 
workers.  This, according to different permanent workers at different farms, was 
R60 as against the R50 seasonal workers resident on the farm earned.  When this 
differential first came too light, it seemed most improbable that off-farm workers 
could be earning more than those resident on the farm. However, a number of 
interviewees at different farms confirmed that this was indeed the case.  
The ostensible justification for this differential was that workers who were not 
resident on the farm had to pay for rented accommodation and therefore had higher 
costs. At one farm the permanent workers were sufficiently angry about the 
differential to have confronted the farmer and demanded equal pay for equal work. 
The farmer acceded to the demand.   
It also emerged that on more than one farm workers from Touws River and 
Worcester had been recruited directly by the farmer, as well as workers recruited 
via a labour broker. Probably the pattern of recruiting workers from Touws River 
and Worcester is a residue of the practice documented in the 1970s.57 These 
workers were transported back and forth on a daily basis in an open lorry. But in 
one instance a team of workers from Touws River stayed in a vacant farm house and 
were transported back home on week-ends. They were also paid R10 more than the 
workers resident on the farms.   
Most of the workers had signed written contracts with the farmer, and quite 
often it appeared that the contracts were renewed annually by the farmer.  This was 
probably done on the advice of one of several labour consultants who advise 
farmers in the area, for reasons that are not clear.  However, none of the workers 
had a copy of the contract they had signed, to which they were lawfully entitled.58 
This was one of the issues the shop stewards of M’s union wanted to take up. 
The fact that, close to 15 years after trade unions in agriculture were 
recognised, workers were unable to achieve something as simple as obtaining a 
copy of their contracts of employment is an indictment of the trade union 
movement. A worker who was a member for four or five years of one of the first 
                                                                    
55 This of course assumes that there is no distinction in respect of housing. 
56 M’s union had no arrangement to bargain collectively at any of the farms where it was 
sufficiently representative. The other union interviewed, an affiliate of the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU), had been organised in the valley longer but was only 
representative at one farm and had no bargaining arrangement there.  
57 Levy (fn 33 above). 
58 In terms of the BCEA; see fn 26 above. 




unions to organise in the valley was scathing about his experience. “You hear what 
they say”, he said, “and wait to see what happens.” In his case, nothing did.59  
There was also a story of a union official who went to see Mr Q on behalf of the 
workers he had recruited. The official never reported back to the workers. The next 
time he was seen in the area, he was driving a new Venture. Workers drew their 
own conclusions. “Stofland is filled with workers who have lost the jobs because of 
unions they joined that did nothing to help them”, said a worker who was 
interviewed.   
 The other issue affecting workers at three farms concerned their membership 
of a provident fund. The fund was managed by one of South Africa’s major insurance 
houses, and the tenor of the workers’ complaint was that workers were compelled 
to belong to it. Also the payout in the event of a worker resigning was minimal.  This 
was probably because the rules of the fund penalised workers who resigned by 
allowing the employer to withhold its contributions.  However, the workers were 
not provided with the rules. 
The fact that only three out of seven farms had a provident fund, and that none 
had any kind of medical benefit fund, suggests that there are not many fringe 
benefits for farm workers.60  Probably for this reason other insurance houses have 
identified farm workers as a potential new client base.  At a meeting of M’s union 
held while this research was underway there was a speaker who was also a part-
time broker for an insurance house who emphasised the importance of workers 
making provision for their retirement. 
 
7  WHAT THE ZIMBABWEANS HAD TO SAY 
The Zimbabean migrants, according to W, were dropped off on the N1 in the middle 
of the night and taken to a “white house”. In this house they would be provided with 
free accommodation and food for a period of two weeks. During this period the new 
arrivals were expected to find work and accommodation. Then they were expected 
to start contributing to the “white house” to open the way for the next batch of 
migrants to be treated in a like manner. The “community”’ had tried to locate this 
“white house”. No-one had ever been able to do so.   
It is not clear whether this “white house” is a rural legend, or a metaphor for the 
networks that had brought the migrants to the valley, or an actual dwelling. But it 
was clear that the word was out that the there was money to be made in the valley, 
and Zimbabwean workers interviewed had travelled a long way, sometimes by 
circuitous routes. Some were from Harare. Some were from farms in Zimbabwe. 
Some had travelled to the Department of Home Affairs in Port Elizabeth to get their 
papers in order so as to work in the valley. Probably they went to Port Elizabeth 
because the same networks that brought them to the valley had informed them that 
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medical practitioner in town on the farmer’s account, and the cost of the consultation and 





their prospects were more favourable there than in Worcester or Cape Town 
because of a quota system utilised by Home Affairs.  
All but two of the fifteen Zimbabwean workers interviewed were new arrivals. 
Several were following a family member or spouse who had already found work in 
the valley. There were eight women and nine men. One, who was not a new arrival, 
had been working in the valley for two years and had started out as a seasonal 
worker employed by a contractor. Now he was employed permanently as a security 
guard on one of the farms. The other had also been employed through a contractor 
initially but was now employed directly by the farmer. Nevertheless, both lived off 
the farm in the informal settlement. These were examples of “permanent” workers 
living off-farm.    
Bar the two already mentioned, all the workers interviewed were employed 
through contractors. They referred to the contractors as “spanners”. Probably the 
term derives from the Afrikaans word for team, “span”, but somehow the English 
connotation of tightening bolts seems appropriate. The “spanners” they had to do 
with stayed in the town. Some were in the formal part and others in the informal 
settlement. There were also two Zimbabweans amongst them. The “spanners” had 
dealings with various farmers and would charge a once-off placement fee of R25. 
However, where a worker referred another worker to the “spanner”, the fee would 
sometimes be waived.  
The “spanner” would go round to the farm to check how his workers were doing 
from time to time, but there was little indication that they provided ongoing 
supervision. The farmer, of course, utilised his own supervisors. Sometimes the 
“spanner” would also appoint a Zimbabwean on-site to supervise the workers on the 
basis that such a supervisor would be better able to communicate with the workers. 
Workers were paid in cash, in an envelope with their name on it, but with no other 
particulars provided. No-one signed a contract with the “spanner”.     
The workers were employed on different farms in the valley. Three were 
working on one of the farms belonging to Mr Q’s company. Three did not know the 
name of the farm where they worked. The remainder were on different farms from 
those on which “permanent” workers interviewed were working. However, all were 
paid at what we had already established was the going daily rate for off-farm labour, 
namely R60. The exception was the worker continuously employed.  He earned R50 
a day in line with the minimum wage. This was also in line with the practice already 
identified whereby “permanent” workers may earn less than their seasonal 
counterpart, except that he, as already indicated, did not stay on the farm.  
This worker paid a rental of R400 per month. It was not an unusually high rental 
for a room in a shack in Stofland. All the workers were staying in the informal 
settlements, where they usually rented a room from compatriots who had been in 
the valley for longer. The room was often also shared with their compatriots. Some 
were shared by up to ten workers. 
Seven of the workers interviewed had completed their O Levels, one had 
completed his A Levels and two had university degrees.  Compared to the populace 




of the valley they were highly educated.61  They were also regarded as good 
workers. It is scarcely surprising, then, that they were resented as taking away jobs 
from the local community. The workers complained that they were treated like dogs.  
During the blockade on the N1, they were threatened with beatings if they went to 
work.   
 
8  WHAT THE “SPANNERS” HAD TO SAY 
There was a perception that farmers were encouraging the influx of Zimbabwean 
migrants. Permanent workers interviewed also reported that farmers were assisting 
migrants to get asylum papers from the Department of Home Affairs. Zimbabwean 
migrants confirmed that this did indeed happen. A contractor claimed there were 
farmers who were hiring migrants directly from the township and paying them R30 
a day.62 Tensions had been mounting about lorry-loads of workers seen leaving 
Stofland. “They cannot do the work”, it was claimed. “The workers who know the 
work are not given a chance.” 
The three contractors interviewed had all been involved in a bid to establish an 
association, of which W had been the chairperson.63 One had only completed Grade 
7, but the other two had secondary schooling and W had matriculated. W had 
previously been employed by the state but had been boarded due to ill-health. He 
lived in what could pass, in a small rural town, as a lower middle-class house.  
All three had essentially the same grievance.  They were interviewed near the 
start of the season in November and had had no work since April, whereas the 
previous year they had been busy for most of this period. They believed they were 
not getting contracts because they had registered as employers with the Department 
of Labour and Compensation Fund.64  
It is believed that labour brokers or contractors in agriculture generally pay 
piece-rates. Piece-rates do apply in the peak season, but this is a long established 
practice that applies both to those employed through contractor and those 
employed directly by the farmers. During peak season the contractors had to 
maintain a schedule recording each worker’s output. Sometimes workers earned a 
R1 000 a week. Outside of peak season, the contractor maintained that they paid the 
minimum wage to their workers.  There were about 50 registered contractors in the 
valley, it was claimed.65 Now their association had collapsed and most of the 
registered contractors were without work.   
It was, after all, easy for someone to set himself or herself up as a contractor. A 
woman might see a farmer driving in town and call out: “are you looking for 
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workers?” If the farmer answered in the affirmative she would simply get together a 
team, there and then. She would not bother to register as an employer or for the 
purposes of the Compensation Fund. She would also not register the workers she 
employed.   
The contractors claimed to know who the unregistered contractors were and 
which farms utilised their services. But they had not reported them to the 
Department of Labour. When asked why not, it was suggested they first needed 
proof. The Department of Labour official had a different explanation: it was simply 
that one contractor was not prepared to report another. Put it down to class 
solidarity amongst contractors.  
All three had started their careers as contractors at about the same time, in the 
year 2000.  All three worked from their homes, in the formal part of town, as sole 
proprietors of their businesses. One claimed to have registered as an employer from 
the outset.  The other two did so a few years later.  The modus operandi in all three 
cases was the same.  Each had a business card that they handed out to farmers in the 
valley. The benefit for the farmer of utilising their services, according to W, was that 
“we remove a big burden from his shoulders… Injuries are our responsibility.”  
Each also had a “permanent” team of workers who were registered with the 
Department of Labour. W printed a specimen contract of employment off his 
personal computer as proof of his compliance with labour legislation. Amongst this 
team, each “employed” a supervisor whose function it was to assemble the required 
number of workers when there was a contract.  If more workers were required than 
in the team of “permanent” workers, “casuals” were employed.  Because the farmer 
would invariably require the workers at short notice, it was not possible to register 
these “casuals” at the Department of Labour. 
The contractors’ demand was to be paid R10 per worker placed per day, but 
farmers would often not agree to this rate.  More often they were paid R5 per 
worker per day. This was supposed to cover the administrative costs of employing 
and remunerating the workers as well as their transport to and from work.  
Sometimes their contract with the farmer was in writing: one such contract, with 
one of the large employers in the valley, described itself as an employment 
contract.66 At other times the contract would be verbal.  The disadvantage of a 
verbal contract was that the farmer or his manager could, after an interval, try and 
enter into a separate contract with the supervisor, cutting out the contractor.  This 
had happened to one of the contractors on two occasions. 
It was from interviews with contractors that we first gauged the level of anger 
in the community, as well as getting an indication of the form it would take. If they 
were not given work, the contractors were planning a blockade of the town until 
their demands were met.  
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9  CONCLUSIONS 
The workers interviewed were employed at some 15 farms in the valley. This is a 
small proportion of the farms in the valley. But there was a degree of consistency in 
what the interviewees said. Some of what they had to say confirmed what other 
commentators had already found. Other things were surprising and at odds with 
what other commentators had said about the conditions of farm workers in general. 
But this, I suggest, only emphasises the need for understanding how local labour 
markets are organised and employment is structured. This has much to do with 
local circumstances, including whether or not workers are organised, and how 
effective their organisations are.  
It is most surprising, for example, that the most vulnerable section of the 
workforce, migrants employed on a seasonal basis, should be earning a higher rate 
than seasonal workers resident on farms, and indeed many permanent workers. It 
suggests that farmers in the area were aware there was a time bomb in Stofland that 
was about to explode, and that wages were likely to be an underlying cause. It might 
also be prompted by a policy of divide and rule. Whether or not that is so, it also 
suggests that in an affluent farming area, such as this one, the wages imposed by the 
sectoral determination may set a ceiling rather than lift the floor.   
It seems one can no longer assume that permanent workers on farms are mostly 
men, and that women access employment and housing through a male partner or 
male family member.67 It is of course still true that women are relegated to lower 
skilled and low-paying tasks, if one has regard to the residents of Stofland and 
elsewhere that supply seasonal labour from off the farm. Yet the influx of migrants is 
also affecting the gender composition of the workforce. Similarly, while the trend to 
employ off-farm seasonal labour has been documented, a trend to source 
“permanent” workers off farm may also be beginning.  
But this study is too narrow in its scope to make definitive statements about 
trends. Its object, as indicated, was firstly to assess whether there had been a growth 
of indirect employment attributable to the labour regime, and its consequences. 
Secondly, it was to interrogate an argument that blames the labour regime for job 
losses. Thirdly, it was to consider the validity and usefulness of regarding farm 
workers as part of a “marginal working class”. Each of these themes is dealt with 
below. 
All indications are that indirect employment in the valley is massive, and one 
could hardly make a meaningful statement about employment there without having 
regard to its extent. This, in turn, raises a question about the usefulness of official 
statistics that differentiate between the “formal” and “informal” economy in other 
sectors but not in agriculture. It also illustrates the limitations of the distinction 
between “formal” and “informal”, based on the registered status of the contractor. 68 
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Apart from difficulties in determining the registered status of a contractor 
(contractors may be, and frequently are, registered with one authority but not 
another), this is not the most important consideration if one is concerned with the 
conditions under which workers are employed.  
All the workers interviewed in this study would properly seem to belong to the 
formal economy, in that they are paid the minimum wage and labour legislation is 
complied with. Yet to describe the Zimbabwean migrants as “formal” is to discount 
completely the precariousness of their position. In part this is because they are 
migrants. However, as employees, the roots of this precariousness are no different 
from those of other workers employed on a similar basis, and indeed the contractors 
that “employ” them. All are dependent on the farmers who provide the work. The 
employment of all (including the contractors) can be terminated at will by the 
farmers if it suits them to do so. Or the farmers can simply not provide them with 
work. 
This is indeed a situation that can be attributed to the labour regime, insofar as 
the “sanctity of contract” still prevails and insofar as labour legislation has created 
the legal space employers have needed to restructure employment in this way. 
However, there was no inevitability about this development or its extent. Perhaps 
the most significant feature of the incorporation of agriculture into a new labour 
relations regime is that it was accomplished by and large without the involvement of 
the trade union movement. Farm workers were always and still are largely 
unorganised.69 As a consequence centralised bargaining, the bug-bear of employers, 
is unknown. To the extent that collective bargaining takes place at all it is at a local 
level and of very limited scope. In addition, both because of a weak union presence 
and the physical isolation of farm workers, agriculture has probably been affected 
less than other sectors by the dispute resolution system the LRA introduced.70  
The legal space employers have utilised could be closed down in any of a 
number of ways, and pressure is mounting on government and courts to do so. 
Namibia has adopted legislation banning labour brokers, which has been overruled 
as being unconstitutional.71 But given the pervasiveness of the phenomenon a more 
pragmatic approach may be to regulate them or to introduce measures that would 
facilitate trade union organisation and collective bargaining. Probably what 
restrains government from doing so are the institutional pressures to deregulate 
from the World Bank and others, already referred to. However, in this case study at 
least, there is no hint of the labour regime or labour regulation causing job losses.  
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What then of the notion of farm workers belonging to a “marginal working 
class”, differentiated from a “core working class”? There is ample evidence of 
stratification in this study: between workers resident on farms and workers from 
off-farm, between permanent and seasonal workers, between workers directly 
employed by the farmer and those employed by the contractor, and even between 
workers employed by the same contractor (some are called “permanent”, others are 
“casuals”). But these are not class distinctions. All are dependent for their livelihood 
on the same source.  
There is also stratification between workers in agriculture and workers in 
manufacturing and other sectors of the economy. However, these different strata are 
in the same relation to those on whom they depend for a livelihood.  If “marginal” is 
understood in a descriptive sense, to describe the consequences of disorganisation 
and disunity, it has some value. However, it makes neither descriptive nor analytic 
sense to regard workers in agriculture as part of a separate class.    
The contractors are in an ambivalent position, much like supervisors and lower 
management. On the one hand they can be viewed as agents of externalisation. Yet 
they also perceive themselves as exploited, as indeed they are. It might be because 
the farmer or his consultant had a precedent of an employment contract at hand 
that the contractor has been referred to as “the employee” in a contract with the 
farmer. On the other hand, it is also a reflection of the power relationship between 
them. For this reason contractors, like farm workers, also need protection against 
wage competition, particularly those who pay the minimum wage. There are the 
unregistered contractors who are able to provide the same service at lower costs. 
Then there are the “spanners” who seem to be operating more as placement 
agencies, charging a once-off fee. 
The problem of disunity amongst the working class has been underscored by so-
called “xenophobic” violence that occurred in various parts of the country in May 
2008.  The N1 blockade in November 2007 might easily have spilled over into 
violence against migrants. As the community leader commented: “Tonight someone 
just has to say ‘I’ve had enough of these Zimbabweans’. A Zimbabwean living here 
told me ‘We are afraid.’ ”  
This case study also illustrates why the term “xenophobia” has little explanatory 
value. A phobia is an irrational fear. There is nothing irrational about the 
competition between strata of the working class for scarce job opportunities.   
The problem this study highlights is one of organisation. The function of a trade 
union is to organise the different strata and to prevent wage competition, through 
establishing collective bargaining arrangements. In the absence of such 
arrangements farm workers are not able to achieve the status of respected partners. 
Instead they are dependent on the largesse of the state. The paternalistic farmer is 
displaced by the paternalistic state.  
For workers in indirect employment the workplace is not the farm where they 
are employed. Notionally, it is the house or shack where the contractor stays. If any 
single measure were adopted to facilitate trade union organisation, it would be to 





prevents such workers from exercising organisational rights. As matters stand, 
these workers have been disenfranchised as industrial citizens or the rural 
equivalent thereof. As a consequence, there has been a process of “passive 
deregulation” parallel to the extension of labour regulation to agriculture.72 If “the 
poor” are to resolve these problems, they need to rediscover the forms of 
organisation have historically relied on.   
 
10  POSTSCRIPT: NOVEMBER 2009 
In November 2009, a year after the field-work for this study was undertaken, at the 
start of the season there was violence against Zimbabwean migrants. Residents of 
Stofland expelled them from De Doorns and again blockaded the N1. None of the 
explanations advanced for their conduct, which boil down to migrants working for 
less than the minimum wage at the behest of farmers or labour brokers, are 
plausible in the light of this study.73 What is more plausible is that competition 
amongst labour brokers may have been a contributory factor or cause. After all, they 
represent influential individuals in the community, each with their own teams of 
workers that look to them to secure work, and can be easily mobilised.74  
This does not detract from the failure of government to develop appropriate 
policies, both to regulate labour broking and to respond to the influx of foreign 
migrants, and a failure the part of civil society and the trade unions to develop forms 
of organisation that incorporate workers regardless of their origins.  
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